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Eﬀective and timely evacuation is critical in alleviating the impact of hurricanes. As such, evacuation models are often
sought to support the preparedness of evacuations. One important task in the modeling process is to evaluate exogenous
factors that cause transportation system capacity loss during evacuation. Typical factors include direct damage to the
roadway network due to storm surge and cascading impacts because of other facilities failures. For example, power outage
can lead to signal failure and subway suspension. This paper aims to develop a macroscopic simulation-based approach to
study the capacity loss of the roadway network in evacuation due to signal loss as a consequence of power outage. In
particular, to simulate the case in which traﬃc signals lose power, a capacity-reduction model from signalized intersections to unsignalized (all-way stop control) intersections was developed and calibrated using microscopic model
created in SUMO and Synchro. We used the downtown Manhattan as a case study area and created a hypothetical powergrid network in terms of neighborhoods. Six scenarios were built to simulate power loss of diﬀerent neighborhoods. The
simulation results give insights on how cascading failures of power network aﬀect roadway network and
evacuation process.

1. Introduction
One of the most challenging issues in prehurricane evacuation planning is the uncertainties of the actual conditions
that may cause roadway capacity loss and additional delays.
So, evaluating such uncertainties is critical for emergency
planning and management and, to some extent, to alleviate
negative impacts of hurricanes. Road network degradation
can be attributable to either endogenous or exogenous
reasons. Endogenous risks refer to uncertainties of the
transportation system supply, as discussed in Li and Ozbay
[1], while exogenous risks are due to external impacts,
speciﬁcally, incident-induced capacity loss during the
evacuation operations. According to real-world incident

data collected during evacuation before the landfall of
Hurricane Sandy, there are ﬁve types of incidents that have a
direct impact on the highway network: accident, debris,
disabled vehicle, downed trees, and ﬂooding [2, 3]. Apart
from direct impact of storm surge on the transportation
network, hurricanes also bring disruptions to other city
infrastructures, such as power and communication systems.
Unlike accidents or ﬂooding that directly results in lane/road
blockages, these infrastructures do not direct impact on the
evacuation routes. Instead, the strong wind and rain fall
before hurricane landfall could result in downed trees and
other incident that cause failure of power infrastructure and
then cause cascading failures of the transportation systems.
For example, massive power outages caused by hurricanes
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may take out traﬃc signals and result in gridlocks at the
signalized intersections. Failure of the power system can also
aﬀect other transportation systems (e.g., subways) that
heavily rely on power supply.
Existing research has made great eﬀorts in modeling the
impact of endogenous risks associated with transportation
system planning in evacuation [1]. However, there was still
limited progress in probing the impact of the exogenous
risks. As such, this paper contributes to the literature by
making some attempts in this perspective. Speciﬁcally, it
aims to model the cascading failures of power networks
during storm surge. In particular, it considered downtown
Manhattan that has experienced severe cascading failures of
infrastructure systems during Hurricane Sandy as the study
area. Considering the limited availability of power-grid data,
a hypothetical power network using urban neighborhoods as
the fundamental units is constructed. Each neighborhood is
denoted as a node, and hypothetical links are used to connect
these nodes based on an adjacency matrix. A simulationbased approach is then developed to analyze diﬀerent scenarios of traﬃc signal control system failures as a result of
the power loss. This facilitates the evaluation of the cascading
impact on evacuation performance and transportation
system resiliency.
1.1. Literature Reviews. In recent years, cascading failures of
various infrastructures have drawn increased attention of
researchers. Fotouhi et al. [4] quantiﬁed the resilience of the
urban traﬃc-electric power coupled system using mixedinteger program to address the interdependencies between
urban traﬃc and power distribution systems. Their study
provides an alternative perspective of power to evaluate the
lifeline performance. Zhang et al. [5] proposed a cascading
failure model of public transit network to evaluate station
frequency density under deliberate attack of traﬃc signals.
They built simulation experiments using Jinan in China as a
background city to verify the feasibility of their model. Their
results reveal that by optimizing the station intensity and bus
lanes, cascading survivability of public transit network can
be improved. Oricchio et al. [6] explored the signal operations in ﬂash mode due to power loss. The key ﬁndings of
their study show that ﬂashing modes provide reasonable
performance with lower demand but cause breakdowns at
higher volumes.
Regardless of hurricane impact, a number of studies
focus on methods to estimate the capacity of unsignalized
intersections. Wegmann [7] proposed a methodology to
estimate the capacity of unsignalized intersections using gap
distributions and bunching of major road traﬃc, with
nonhomogeneous and inconsistent behavior of minor road
traﬃc. Baass [8] pointed out that a number of vehicles that
can cross an intersection depend on two factors: number of
acceptable gaps and gap-acceptance distributions. Brilon
and Miltner [9] discussed the conﬂicts of stop-control intersections and proposed the “Conﬂict Technique” to
quantify the capacity loss for the unsignalized intersections.
Prasetijo et al. [10] developed a regression method to
measure unsignalized capacity based on the conﬂicting
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streams with distinct average speed and ﬂow assigned to
each stream. The estimated values were validated by empirical data from Indonesia. Another methodology based on
evaluating expected average delays at multimodal uncontrolled intersections was presented in [11], which can represent the overall magnitude of capacity and delay. However,
most of the previous research regarding capacity measurements of stop-controlled intersections is based on microscopic scenarios. Very few studies have considered the
capacity loss under hurricane scenarios [2]. To utilize
macroscopic planning model to quantify capacity reduction
under signal failures, a new and more generalized approach
is needed.
1.2. Data and Modeling Tools. The network model is based
on the second generation of New York Best Practice
(NYBPM 2G) [12] network. It is a widely used macroscopic
planning model based on TransCAD 6.0 [13]. The NYBPM
network is a generalization of the street network of New
York City (NYC) metropolitan area that can be regarded as a
directed graph. The intersections and roadways between
intersections are represented by nodes and links of the
graph, respectively. Each link also has attributes, such as
from-node, to-node, direction (s), number of lanes per
direction, functional class (fclass [14] and codes shown in
Table 1), and original capacity. There is no attribute for
nodes, but their attributes can be retrieved by adjacent links
and combined with other spatial data. The nodes and links
do not completely overlap with (but close to) actual roads
and intersections, and some of local streets are replaced by
centroid connectors. Most of major streets, especially for
Manhattan, are kept in the model.
The limitation of this network is that there is no information on whether an intersection is signalized or not. To
solve this issue, OpenStreetMap (OSM) [15] data are used.
The OSM data contain the information of signalized intersections, such as signal post location and base signal
timings. These attributes can provide the signalization information of all the intersections in the studied network.
To estimate and calibrate the intersection capacity
under the power-loss scenario, two distinct microscopic
simulation tools, namely, Behrisch [16] and Husch [17], are
utilized. SUMO is a robust microsimulation tool that
gained popularity in recent years, due to the ﬂexibility of
scenario settings, including detailed capabilities of simulation of signalized and unsignalized intersections. Synchro
is a traditional microscopic simulation tool which is widely
used in the US. Synchro includes a powerful signal-timing
optimization tool and HCM 2010 [18] support, which can
be applied to measure the performance of intersections
under varied control scenarios. Particularly, the unsignalized intersection delay model was included in the tool, as
mentioned in Chapter 19 and 20 of HCM 2010. Both
simulation tools can estimate the capacity reduction due to
the transition from signalized to unsignalized control, by
measuring saturation ﬂow rates under two circumstances
where their level of services (LOS) are assumed to be
equivalent.
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Table 1: Functional class codes [14].

Type
Principal arterial-interstate
Principal arterial-other freeway/expressway
Principal arterial-other
Minor arterial
Major collector
Minor collector
Local

Urban code
11
12
14
16
17
18
19

2. Methodology
This main objective of this paper is to build and test an
evacuation scenario under the cascading failures of power
and signalized intersection networks. The lower Manhattan
in New York City is selected as the study area. Before and
after the land fall of Hurricane Sandy, the study area suﬀered
from signiﬁcant power-loss and signal failures that lasted for
a couple of days.
Typically, malfunction of traﬃc signals caused by power
outage shows ﬂashing red lights for several hours using their
backup power and then becomes dark if the outage lasts
longer. In the United States, a ﬂashing red is equivalent to
all-way stop control (AWSC) [18]. Therefore, this study
assumes that the control type of intersections converts from
signalized to AWSC when they lose power, which is the
needed safety action when traﬃc signals encounter outage.
In the macroscopic model, the eﬀect of the switch from a
signalized to an unsignalized intersection can be measured
by calculating the diﬀerence between the capacity of a
signalized capacity and the capacity of AWSC. So, the core of
this modeling methodology is how to quantify the loss of
intersection capacity as a result of power outage.
There are some important challenges. Firstly, in typical
modeling of AWSC intersections, input like turning
movements or turning rates are known. However, they are
absent in the data used in this study. Secondly, the signal
timing of the NYBPM model is considered through the
reduction of intersection capacity and cannot be extracted
separately. Thus, it is not possible to build a relationship
between existing signalized and unsignalized intersection
capacities. Considering intersection types, directions, and
number of lanes, there are more than a hundred combinations of intersection structures in the study area, including
four-way and T (or Y) intersections. A number of lanes for
each direction range from 0 (one-way street) to 5. HCM 2010
provides a method to calculate the capacity of the AWSC
intersections. However, such method does not include the
cases in which the number of lanes per direction exceeds two
(such case satisﬁes the warrants of signalized intersection).
The same limitation also applies to Synchro. SUMO, however, can simulate unsignalized scenarios with more than
two lanes, but its capacity is related to a number of vehicular
parameters such as gap acceptance and driver aggressiveness. These values can be adjusted to identify capacity values
that are in agreement with the Synchro output.
By considering aforementioned diﬃculties, a generalized
solution based on microsimulation models of selected

Rural code
01
02
04
06
07
08
09

Code for modeling
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

typical intersections can be built. Both in Synchro and
SUMO, intersections with no more than three lanes per
direction are created. The capacity value obtained from
SUMO is calibrated using Synchro results. For intersections
with more than three lanes, capacity is calculated based on
SUMO’s estimations. Finally, the capacity along with attributes of selected intersections is used to build a predictive
model of unsignalized capacity.
Following sections describe the modeling approach in
detail. Firstly, the data for modeling and prediction are
ﬁltered and processed. Then, capacity-loss models are
constructed based on results from microscopic simulation
models. Lastly, the model is used to predict capacity loss for
all signalized intersections and update the simulation
network.
2.1. Data Filtering and Processing. As mentioned above,
there are no attributes for nodes, so spatial attributes, such as
neighborhood tabulation area (NTA) that intersection belongs to, are assigned to the nodes. Besides, attributes of
connected links can also be found by using a lookup table of
links. This step constructs a data table of nodes that contains
information about connected links such as name of the
streets, number of lanes, and capacity for each direction.
The following step is used to ﬁlter the nodes that correspond to signalized intersections out of all nodes. This
approach contains two operations: check if the node is
actually an intersection (not expressway interchange or
ramp), and if they are close to traﬃc signals. This can be done
as follows: if all the links connect to the node belong to an
expressway (whose fclass is 11 or 12), the node is not an
intersection. If the node is conﬁrmed as an intersection, the
distance from each node to the location of nearest traﬃc
light is measured, which is obtained from OSM data. If the
distance is lower than certain value, the node is identiﬁed as
signalized. In this study, 220 feet is selected as the ﬁltering
threshold. The ﬁltered signalized intersection is shown in
green dots in Figure 1.
Another task for data processing is to determine the
number of conﬂicts for each intersection. According to
HCM 2010, when the intersection is operating as AWSC, the
capacity of approach is related to conﬂicting approaches, as
shown in Figure 2. If traﬃc is present in the study approach
only (Case 1), subject vehicles depart as rapidly as individual
drivers can safely accelerate and clear the intersection. If one
or more vehicles present in opposing approaches (Cases 2 to
5), subject vehicles have to yield to other approaches to make
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Figure 1: Filtered signalized intersections.

Case 1: vehicle (s) on
subject approach only

Case 2: vehicles on subject
and opposing approaches

Case 4: vehicles on subject
and two other approaches

Case 3: vehicles on subject
and conﬂicting approaches

Case 5: vehicles on all approaches

Figure 2: Description of opposing approaches.

sure that only one vehicle can pass the intersection at the
same time. It can be implied that the throughput of AWSC
intersection is directly related to number of opposing approaches or number of conﬂicts, which can be calculated
from intersection attributes. For example, if there are four
links connected to a node A and three links have lanes
towards A, the number of conﬂicts for node A is 2. For T and
four-way intersections, the maximum numbers of conﬂicts

are 2 and 3, respectively. Please refer to Figure 3 for diﬀerent
types of conﬂicts. The data ﬁltering and processing algorithm
is summarized in Figure 4.
2.2. Modeling of Intersection Capacity Loss. As mentioned
above, Synchro and SUMO are used to calculate and calibrate
the unsignalized intersection capacity loss. Five intersections
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Conﬂict
Intersection

0

5

1

2

3

T or Y
junctions

4-way

Figure 3: Conﬂict numbers and types.

located in lower Manhattan are selected as the examples. The
attributes of selected intersections are shown in Table 2.
In the ﬁrst step, Synchro models are used to measure the
capacity of intersections based on default parameters deﬁned
in HCM 2010. Taking Synchro capacity as a benchmark,
multiple simulation runs are made in SUMO. In each run,
crucial behavioral parameters such as gap acceptance and
acceleration rates are adjusted so that the output saturation
ﬂow rate approaches the Synchro capacity. Table 3 shows
calibrated SUMO output based on Synchro capacity.
Based on the calibrated SUMO model, capacity of other
intersections is simulated. Output capacity of intersections is
illustrated in Table 4, along with attributes of the links.

It is observed that the capacity shows strong linear
correlation with the attributes of intersections. Thus, they
were applied to all the intersections of the similar types in the
studied network.
2.3. Prediction and Assignment of Capacity Loss. The last step
of this methodology is to estimate the capacity loss, by
reducing the capacity to the unsignalized level for all
signalized intersections in the designated area. This is
implemented by using the lookup table for all intersections
within the cascading failure zones, and we predict the
capacity loss for each relevant link. It should be noted that
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Figure 4: Pseudocodes of data ﬁltering and processing.

Table 2: Selected intersections and attributes.
Intersection

Approaches
Broadway SB
Canal WB
Canal EB
Center NB
Hester WB
Lafayette SB
Walker EB
Broadway SB
Franklin EB
Church NB
Walker EB

Broadway and Canal Street
Center Street and Hester Street
Lafayette Street and Walker Street
Broadway and Franklin Street
Church Street and Walker Street

Lanes
4
3
3
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
1

Conﬂicts
2
1
1
1
1

Table 3: Calibration results of selected intersection.
Intersection
Broadway and Franklin Street

Approaches
Broadway (T)
Broadway (L)
Franklin (T)
Franklin I

the lower bound of reduced capacity (if original capacity is
greater than 0) is set to 100 rather than 0. The reason for this
assumption is for computational needs that allow iterations
of traﬃc assignment to reach convergence eventually.

Synchro
804
89
416
32

SUMO

Delay (s)

V/C ratio

893

44.7

0.98

448

43.8

0.98

Finally, capacity-loss table for each scenario is built and fed
into the evacuation assignment model. The procedure
adopted in this step is summarized as a pseudocode shown
in Figure 5.
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Table 4: Modeling parameters.

Intersection
Broadway and Canal Street
Center Street and Hester Street
Lafayette Street and Walker Street
Broadway and Franklin Street
Church Street and Walker Street

Lanes
4
3
3
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
1

Conﬂicts
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

fclass
14
14
14
16
17
14
16
14
16
16
16

Capacity
866
639
652
1250
379
889
443
893
448
1258
438

Figure 5: Pseudocode of prediction and assignment of capacity loss.

2.4. Proposed Scenarios. The case study includes six capacityloss scenarios, along with base scenario without capacity
loss. These scenarios, namely, Scenarios 1 to 6, simulate
hypothetical power loss of six NTAs : East Village, West
Village, Soho-TriBeCa-Civic Center-Little Italy, Battery Park
City-Lower Manhattan, Chinatown, and Lower East Side,
respectively. Study area is shown in Figure 6. In each scenario, during the hurricane evacuation process, power loss is

assumed to occur in one of these NTAs and it is assumed to
cause failures of all signals in the respective NTA. The length
of all power-loss scenarios is assumed to be 12 hours, from
midday to midnight.
For all scenarios, the same travel demands are applied
using the same methodology proposed in previous research
2, where the evacuation demand is identiﬁed by calculating
the evacuation population in each census tract, then
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N

Figure 6: The study area.

combining them to generate evacuation O-D matrix in terms
of TAZs (traﬃc analysis zone used in the planning model).
Then, the evacuation traﬃc is split into hours using evacuation response curve. The curve is estimated using traﬃc
counts from Transportation Operations Coordination
Committee (TRANSCOM). Because evacuation only takes
small proportion of total traﬃc demand, background traﬃc
is calculated using the empirical trip table and excluding the
trips towards vulnerable zones. The hourly traﬃc demand is
the sum of evacuation and background demand. The simpliﬁed demand modeling approach is depicted in Figure 7.
By comparing the network performance, the severity of
cascading failures can be evaluated. The evaluation considered
metrics related to OD travel time, speed, and volume during
the study periods among neighborhoods, and the base-case
scenario with no signal failures. The comparative results
provide some insights into the resilience of the neighborhoods.

3. Results
The simulation was implemented through the NYBPM
models, and the results in terms of the changes in travel
times based on TAZs are shown in Figure 8. Travel times

after the power loss are compared with the travel times in the
base scenario, i.e., travel times without any capacity losses.
The average travel time of each TAZ is calculated using travel
times of all the trips leaving a speciﬁc TAZ whose destinations are within Manhattan. Longer interborough trips
were eliminated for the sake of avoiding bias.
It can be shown that in all six scenarios, signal failures
lead to an increase of travel times of the neighborhood, such
impacts which are alleviated for further zones. For Scenario
1 (East Village) and Scenario 2 (West Village), travel times
for TAZs within these NTAs are increased by 20% and less
than 10% percent for other surrounding TAZs. For Scenario
3 of Soho-TriBeCa-Civil Center-Little Italy (STCL), travel
times are increased by 20% to 30%. For Scenario 4 (Battery
Park City-Lower Manhattan), the travel times are more than
doubled in the southern tip of Financial District. Moderate
increase of travel times is observed in a small number of
TAZs within Scenario 5 (Chinatown) and Scenario 6 (Lower
East Side), and its impact is negligible for surrounding
neighborhoods compared to other scenarios.
Figure 9 visualizes the changes in link volumes compared
to the based scenario, together with Figure 10 comparing
diﬀerences of link speeds. It can be found that the 12-hour
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9

Background
and
evacuation
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trip tables
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results
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Figure 7: Demand modeling ﬂowchart.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Range
Power loss

Diﬀerence of travel times
1%

5%

15%

30%

Figure 8: Changes in average travel times by TAZs. (a) Scenario 1: East Village. (b) Scenario 2: West Village. (c) Scenario 3: SoHo-TriBeCaCivic Center-Little Italy. (d) Scenario 4: Battery Park City-Lower Manhattan. (e) Scenario 5: Chinatown. (f ) Scenario 6: Lower East Side.

volumes of roads within power-loss areas are reduced signiﬁcantly, as shown in the green links for each scenario. The
excessive traﬃc is diverted to the neighboring areas and
causes diﬀerent extents of volume increase. For Scenarios 1
and 2, although the volume and speed changes within powerloss zones are observable, the signal failures do not have a
strong impact on neighboring zones. For Scenario 3, however,
the capacity loss of STCL area diverts a considerable amount
of traﬃc to Chinatown and Lower East Side and deteriorates
the performance of nearly the entire network. This is probably
because the critical corridors within STCL, such as Canal
Street and the Holland Tunnel, are disrupted, causing congestion. Compared with Scenario 3, impact area of Scenario 4
is not as signiﬁcant, but a signiﬁcant amount of performance
reduction is observed, especially the amount of traﬃc diverted

to Chinatown. This should be attributed to degraded operation of the Battery Tunnel, and traﬃc is diverted to nearby
Brooklyn and Manhattan Bridges with entrances located in
Chinatown. This can also explain the network-level speed
reduction in Scenario 5. For Scenario 6, the impact of signal
loss is not signiﬁcant and only the links near the Williamsburg
Bridge are primarily aﬀected.
Apart from measures of average performance, the variation of travel times within the study periods is evaluated for
each neighborhood, as displayed in Figure 11. For all six
capacity-loss scenarios, the travel times are higher than the
base scenario. Such diﬀerences are higher in the ﬁrst hours of
evacuation period and become lower with reduction of travel
demands. It can be observed that Scenario 3 causes the most
signiﬁcant increases of travel times for all neighborhoods.

10
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Diﬀerence of volume
–100%

0%

100%

Figure 9: Changes in link volumes. (a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2. (c) Scenario 3. (d) Scenario 4. (e) Scenario 5. (f ) Scenario 6.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

Diﬀerence of volume
–50%

0%

50%

Figure 10: Diﬀerences in link speeds. (a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2. (c) Scenario 3. (d) Scenario 4. (e) Scenario 5. (f ) Scenario 6.
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10%

10%

0%
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0%

12

15

18
Time

21

12

15

(a)

18
Time

21

12

40%

30%

30%

30%

Change

40%

20%

20%
10%

10%

0%

0%

0%

18
Time

21

12

15

(d)

18
Time

21

20%

10%

15

18
Time
(c)

40%

12

15

(b)

Change

Change

20%

21

12

(e)

15

18
Time

21

(f)

Neighborhood
East village
West village

SoHo-TriBeCa-civic center-little italy
Battery park city-lower manhattan

Chinatown
Lower east side

Figure 11: Variation of travel times for neighborhoods. (a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2. (c) Scenario 3. (d) Scenario 4. (e) Scenario 5.
(f ) Scenario 6.

For Scenarios 4 and 6, the capacity loss aﬀects its own
neighborhood rather than neighboring zones. The impacts
of Scenarios 1, 2, and 5 on the network are close and also
follow the temporal patterns. The impact of Scenario 6 is the
lowest. These results are in agreement with the other ﬁndings
above.
The results above show that when the signal failures
happen in STCL, southern tip of Battery Park, and the
eastmost of TAZs in Lower East Sides neighborhood, they
lead to considerable degrading of roadway performance.
This result implies that if the signal failure occurred next to
major roadway links used for evacuation, such as entrances
of critical bridges and tunnels, then their capacity will be
reduced signiﬁcantly. This is due to the large traﬃc demand
and missing of signal controls for major intersections located in these areas. These results provide an insight into the
prehurricane resilience for diﬀerent neighborhoods located
in lower Manhattan, which can be used to infer that roadway
systems in the East Village, West Village, and Lower East
Side are more resilient and can maintain a more stable level
of service compared to neighborhoods such as STCL and
Battery Park during evacuation under signal failures.

4. Conclusions
This paper discussed the cascading failures of signal systems
due to the failure of power-supply infrastructure. Based on

the existing literature and common practice, signalized
intersections losing power were treated as AWSC. Diﬀerences in intersection capacity are modeled and calibrated
based on the results obtained from microscopic intersection
models.
A scenario-based macroscopic model was built to simulate its impacts on the transportation network and evacuation process. Six evacuation scenarios with the same
evacuation demand and signal failures at diﬀerent locations
were built. Besides, spatial-temporal patterns of zonal and
link performances were evaluated. It can be concluded that
the impact of signal failures can have a strong inﬂuence on
evacuation eﬃciency for both the area where power is lost
and its surrounding areas. Also, the signiﬁcance of the
impact is related to the intensity of evacuation demand,
density of traﬃc signals, adjacency to the major roadway
links, and interconnectivity to neighboring zones.
The model proposed in this approach can provide insight
for government agencies and planners of transportation system
resilience. For example, the model can show the vulnerable
intersection or roadway segments and evaluate the impact of
signal failures during the evacuation process, so the government agencies can locate the priority area when taking actions
to guarantee the traﬃc operation. In addition, considering the
diﬀerent levels of resilience, the model can help the decision
makers to identify the evacuation destinations and routes in
which the traﬃc impact by the power outage is minimal.

12
In future study, the proposed unsignalized capacityloss model can be improved by conducting SUMO analyses using additional combinations of physical geometries and mixed traﬃc conditions. Besides traﬃc signals,
the cascading failures of the power system can also include
malfunction of the public transit system, particularly
subway systems. Another possible direction is to evaluate
additional demands diverted from public transit to the
road network due to the suspension of the subway
network.
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